as we said

<<originally:

<<for if

<<they did

<<repentance,

<<the court

<<on high

<<forgives

<<them.

<<What

<<do you say —

<<but

<<they did not

<<do

<<repentance?

<<Not

<<definitive

<<is the matter

<<for kares.

Rabbi Yitzchak

<<says:

<<those liable to kares

<<in the general rule

<<were [included];

<<and why

<<was singled out

<<kares

<<with his sister?

<<To judge him

<<with kares

<<and not

<<with lashes.

And the Rabbis —

<<kares

<<with his sister,

<<why do I need it?

<<To divide [the liability],

<<and as Rabbi Yochanan [said],

<<for Rabbi Yochanan said:

<<that if

<<he did them

<<all

<<in one lapse of awareness,

<<he is liable

<<for

<<each and every one.

And Rabbi Yitzchak —

<<to divide,

<<from where does he derive it?

<<He derives it

<<from ‘and to

<<a woman

<<in the separation of

<<her impurity’ —

<<to make liable

<<for

<<each and every woman.

And the Rabbis

<<too —

<<let them derive it

<<from this!

<<Yes, so it is.

<<But then,

<<the kares

<<of his sister —

<<why do I need it?

<<To make him liable

<<for

<<his sister,

<<and for

<<the sister of

<<his father,

<<and for

<<the sister of

<<his mother.

That is obvious —

<<these are

<<bodies

<<distinct,

<<these are

<<prohibitions

<<distinct!

<<Rather,

<<to make him liable

<<for

<<his sister

<<who is

<<the sister of

<<his father

<<who is

<<the sister of

<<his mother.

<<And how

<<do you find it?

<<With a wicked man

<<son of a wicked man.

And Rabbi Yitzchak —

<<this

<<from where does he derive it?

<<He derives it

<<from an a fortiori,

<<as it is taught:

<<Rabbi Akiva said:

<<I asked

<<Rabban Gamliel

<<and Rabbi Yehoshua

<<in the meat market

<<of

<<Emmaus,

<<where they went

<<to buy

<<an animal

<<for the feast of

<<the son

<<of

<<Rabban Gamliel:

<<one who has relations

<<with

<<his sister

<<who is

<<the sister of

<<his father

<<who is

<<the sister of

<<his mother —

<<what is [the law]?

<<[Is he not]

<<liable

<<for

<<all of them

<<but

<<one,

<<or

<<is he liable

<<for

<<each and every one?

They said

<<to him:

<<this

<<we have not

<<heard;

<<but

<<we have heard:

<<one who has relations

<<with

<<five

<<women

<<who are niddos

<<in one lapse of awareness,

<<that he is liable

<<for

<<each and every one;

<<and it appears

<<reasonable

<<by an a fortiori:

<<if

<<niddah,

<<which is

<<prohibition

<<one,

<<he is liable

<<for

<<each and every one,

<<here,

<<where three

<<prohibitions [apply] —

<<how much more so?

And the other?

<<The a fortiori

<<is refuted

<<it is:

<<what of niddah —

<<for there

<<the bodies

<<are distinct.

And for the other

<<too,

<<this

<<certainly

<<a fortiori

<<is refuted

<<it is!

<<Rather,

<<he derives it

<<from ‘his sister’

<<at the end [of the verse].

And the other —

<<‘his sister’

<<at the end,

<<why do I need it?

<<To make him liable

<<for

<<his sister

<<the daughter of

<<his father

<<and the daughter of

<<his mother,

<<to say

<<that one does not

<<punish

<<on the basis of logic.

And the other?

<<If you wish, say:

<<he derives

<<the punishment

<<from the warning.

<<And if you wish, say:

<<he derives it